This study investigates the trading activity in options and stock markets around informed events with extreme daily stock price movements. We find that informed agents are more likely to trade options prior to negative news and stocks ahead of positive news. We also show that optioned stocks overreact to the arrival of negative news, but react efficiently to positive news. However, the overreaction patterns are unique to the subsample of stocks with the lowest pre-event abnormal option/stock volume ratio (O/S). This finding suggests that the incremental benefit of option listing is related to the level of option trading activity, over and beyond the presence of an options market on the firm's stock. Finally, we find that the preevent abnormal O/S is a better predictor of stock price patterns following a negative shock than is the pre-event O/S, implying that the former may contain more information about the future value of stocks than the latter.
Introduction
We propose an innovative approach that we use to investigate several issues relating to the impact of option listing on the informational efficiency of the underlying stocks. Our analysis is based on examining transactions volumes in options and stock markets around "informed" shocks in excess of 10% (sign ignored) 1 and relating the level of trading activity in options and stock to the stock price reaction to shocks. This approach allows us to address the following important questions empirically: Do informed traders prefer to trade options or stock? Does the relative concentration of informed traders in options or stock markets affect the informational efficiency of the underlying stocks?
Whilst some of these issues have attracted a lot of attention in the literature, existing theoretical arguments remain ambiguous and empirical evidence is largely inconclusive. Figlewski (1989) argues that the effect of options introduction on the informational efficiency of the underlying stocks will mainly depend on the quality of information possessed by the newly attracted traders. Cox and Rubinstein (1985) argue that the opportunity to use options to construct portfolios that effectively circumvent restrictions imposed on selling short may increase the attractiveness of the options markets to informed traders. Thus, options may enhance the speed of price adjustment to information, enabling informed investors to trade more quickly and efficiently on their private information. However, Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) argue that options offer noise traders opportunities to hedge their stock positions at a low cost. Stein (1989) argues that, if options markets are more attractive to noisy traders, information released by option traders may inflict a negative externality on those traders already in the market, impairing their ability to make inferences from prices. In other words, the increased amount of noise trading in the options market may delay the speed at which new information is incorporated into the stock price. More recently, Roll et al. (2010) argue that the informational efficiency benefit from option listing should depend on whether the market for the listed option has sufficient volume, as informed traders would be more active in high-volume markets (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1988) .
Consistent with the notion that informed traders prefer to trade options than stock, Easley et al. (1998) and Pan and Poteshman (2006) show that option trading volumes contain useful information about future stock prices. Cao et al. (2005) show that information asymmetry is greater in options than in stock and argue that informed agents find the options 1 We define "informed" daily price shocks as large one-day price changes caused by the news announcements in the Regulatory News Service (RNS) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE).
markets to be more attractive venues for trading. Peterson (1995) and Choi and Jayaraman (2009) find that optioned stocks react more efficiently to large price declines than their nonoptioned counterparts. Roll et al. (2010) examine the trading volume in options (including both call and put contracts) relative to the trading volume in stocks (O/S) around earnings announcements. They argue that the positive association between pre-announcement O/S and post-announcement absolute returns implies that at least part of the pre-announcement option trading is informed 2 . However, many other studies provide evidence in favor of the view that informed traders prefer to transact in stock rather than options markets. Stephan and Whaley (1990) find that the price changes in the stock markets lead the options markets by as much as fifteen minutes. Similarly, Chan et al. (2002) show that the stock net-trading volume, but not the options net-trading volume, has a strong ability to predict stock and options quote revisions.
By examining trading activities in options and stock prior to the arrival of pricesensitive news, and relating these activities to the stock price reaction to informed shocks, this study contributes to the literature in at least two important ways. First, we argue that stock and options volume analysis around informed shocks offers an innovative approach to investigating whether traders prefer to initiate trades in options or stock prior to the arrival of news. Spyrou et al. (2011) provide evidence that informed traders are active in the options markets during the month preceding a mergers and acquisition announcement. However, their analysis does not necessarily imply that informed traders prefer to transact in options than stock markets. Building on Roll et al. (2010) , we also use abnormal O/S to evaluate the relative trading activity in the options and stock markets around news announcements. We argue that the changes in trading activity around price-sensitive news announcements may be better captured by abnormal O/S than the standard O/S measure of Roll et al., as a high O/S ratio associated with a given firm may not be unique to the windows around news events.
Roll et al. report high O/S around earnings announcements, but do not distinguish between positive and negative announcements. We argue that this distinction is important as short-sale constraints in the equity market may make options markets more attractive venues for trading on negative news than positive news.
Second, we evaluate the extent to which abnormal option or stock trading can increase the speed at which information is incorporated into stock prices. Specifically, we examine the 2 Roll et al. (2010) uses O/S to measure the relative trading activity in options and stock. They argue that an increase in O/S prior to the arrival of important news would indicate that relatively more informed trading is taking place in options than stock markets, and vice versa.
link between the level of option trading activity and the stock price reaction to new information, in order to test Roll et al.'s (2010) prediction that the incremental benefit of option listing should be related to the level of option trading activity, as a thin, inactive market would repel all traders, both informed and uninformed. Our analysis differs from existing studies on the impact of option listing on stock price adjustments to shocks, such as Peterson (1995) and Choi and Jayaraman (2009) , in a number of important aspects. First, we examine the impact of the level of option trading, rather than the availability of option trading on a firm's stock, on the stock price reaction to shocks. Second, our analysis focuses on "informed" events only, as informed trading is conditioned on the presence of information prior to large price changes (see also Larson & Madura, 2003) . In other words, if some extreme price movements are caused by liquidity or noise trading, option trading activity prior to these events may not imply the presence of informed trading. Finally, we evaluate option and stock trading activity around both positive and negative shocks to test whether equity short-sale costs lead informed traders to trade options more frequently in the case of negative news than positive news.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we show that daily abnormal O/S is statistically significant prior to large price declines, but not significantly different from zero in the period immediately prior to positive news announcements. This finding implies that informed traders are more likely to trade options in response to negative signals than positive ones. This evidence is robust to alternative option volume measures, estimation windows and definitions of price shocks. Second, we show that optioned stocks overreact to negative shocks, but react efficiently to positive ones. This result suggests that the existence of options markets does not always cause stock prices to react efficiently to shocks. It also indicates that the informational efficiency benefit of options may depend on other factors, including the relative trading activity in options and stock markets. We show that the positive rebound following a negative shock is negatively associated with pre-event abnormal O/S. In other words, our results suggest that the concentration of informed traders in options helps investors to estimate the true value of the stock. This finding supports Roll et al.'s (2009) view that the informational efficiency benefit of the options markets depends on the trading activity in options, over and above the mere listing of options on the firm's stock. Finally, both the subsample analysis and the regression results suggest that pre-event abnormal O/S is a better predictor of stock price patterns following a negative shock than is the pre-event O/S, implying that the former may contain more information about the future value of stocks than the latter.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology. Section 3 describes our dataset and provides a brief summary of the descriptive statistics. Section 4 reports the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
Empirical procedures
This section describes the various variables used to evaluate the informational role of options and stock in the period preceding price-sensitive news announcements. Following other studies on the market reaction to price shocks (e.g. Cox & Peterson, 1994; Faff & Hillier, 2005; Mazouz et al. 2009 ), event study methods are used to estimate abnormal trading activities and abnormal returns around informed shocks.
Abnormal volume estimates
We begin our analysis by investigating the trading activities in options and stock markets prior to the arrival of price-sensitive news. We estimate the cross-sectional average abnormal volume on day t ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ and over a window ( ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ ) around the events as follows: We argue that the use of abnormal O/S to assess the relative informativeness of traders in options and stock markets forms an important methodological innovation in this study. Roll et al.'s (2010) O/S measure may lead to misleading conclusions on the relative ability of options and stock markets to attract informed traders, as some firms may have consistently higher O/S for reasons unrelated to the arrival of information.
Stock price reaction to informed shocks
We examine the link between option trading activity and the informational efficiency of the underlying stocks by analyzing stock price patterns following informed daily price changes in excess of 10% (sign ignored). The purpose of this analysis is to investigate whether the ability of options markets to stimulate informational efficiency depends on the level of option trading activity. We use the following equation to estimate daily abnormal returns ( around the events (see, e.g., Edmister et al., 1994; Mazouz and Saadouni, 2007) :
where is the continuously compounded return of stock i on day t, computed from the midpoint of the bid and ask prices to control for the bid-ask bounce; is the continuously compounded return on the market portfolio (FTSE All Share Index) at time t; ̂ and ̂ are the coefficients of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for the standard market model over the [-201, -11 ] window prior to the event.
To calculate the cumulative abnormal returns ( ) for stock i over a window of days starting one day after the price shock, we use ∑
The average cumulative abnormal return over a window of days, beginning one day after the shock, and across N stocks, is estimated as
We use the NW t-stat 4 to assess the statistical significance of and . We also employ the non-parametric Mann-Whitney (MW) and Kruskal-Wallis (KW) tests to examine whether the abnormal returns associated with different groups of stocks are statistically different from each other.
Data and sample characteristics
Our analysis is based on a sample of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) stocks with options listed on the Euronext 5 over the period from January 1993 to June 2010. To be included in the sample, a stock must have data available from DataStream on the option trading volume, the stock turnover and the stock price. Firm news is extracted from the Factiva news database owned by Dow Jones & Company. Since the regulatory news category in Factiva is compulsory for the exchange house to disclose to the public, we searched for regulatory news on our stocks across the sample period. We matched the date of a price shock, which is defined as a one-day price movement in excess of 10% (sign ignored), with the dates of news announcements from the Factiva database.
We define our observation window as the eleven days around a large price change, i.e. day -5 to day +5. The use of a five-day post-event window is justified by the findings in the literature that most of the price reversals for large firms are short-lived, with significant abnormal returns observed only in the first three event days after price shocks (Peterson, 1995; Choi & Jayaraman, 2009 ). The pre-event five-day window is included in our analysis to account for the behavior of informed traders who may take advantage of information leakage before events. To avoid confounding effects, multiple price shocks in a single observation window are excluded from the analysis 6 . We also require from each firm a complete set of 150 daily return series over the [-200, -11] Table 1 imply that our sample is biased towards large, liquid and volatile stocks. This bias is consistent with Mayhew and Mihov's (2004) finding that option exchanges are often forward looking and tend to list options on stocks with high market capitalization, trading volume and volatility.
- Table 1 about here the log values of stock volume deviate from normality. Table 2 about here Table 3 (Kyle, 1985; Roll et al., 2010) . To mitigate the influence of autocorrelation on our results, we use the NW t-stat to assess the statistical significance of the abnormal volume measures. Table 3 about here
Empirical results
Informed trading in options and stock markets
The levels of trading activity in options and stock prior to the arrival of price-sensitive news are used to investigate whether informed traders are more likely to transact in options or stock. Table 4 reports the results on the various abnormal volume estimates for the period immediately before the arrival of price-sensitive news. Panel A of Table 4 shows that the average abnormal stock volume over the [-5,-1] and [-3, -1] windows around negative news announcements is positive, but not statistically significant. The highest level of stock trading activity of 0.0188 (with a NW t-stat of 6.49) is observed on the day of the negative news announcement, and a significantly positive abnormal stock volume of 0.0019 is reported one day prior to the arrival of negative news. However, the abnormal stock volumes associated with days -2 through -5 prior to negative news are positive, but not statistically significant.
This finding indicates that stock market traders anticipate the arrival of negative news one day before the announcement date. Our evidence is consistent with the view that at least some informed trading is taking place in the stock market prior to the arrival of news (see, e.g., Easley et al., 2002; Pan & Poteshman, 2006; Spyrou et al., 2011) .
Panel A of Table 4 positive and significant at least at the 10% level. These findings are consistent with the view that option traders are more active than stock traders in the period preceding a negative news announcement (see, e.g., Cox & Rubinstein, 1985; Chakravarty et al., 2004 ). Table 4 about here Table 4 
Option trading and stock price reactions to shocks
We examine the link between trading activity in options and stock and the stock price patterns following informed daily price changes in excess of 10% (sign ignored) so as to assess the ability of the options markets to stimulate the informational efficiency of the underlying stocks. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5 . The figures in Table 5 indicate that the average values of positive and negative shocks are 11.25% and -12.84%, respectively. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following positive informed shocks are not significantly different from zero, implying that optioned stocks react efficiently to the arrival of positive price-sensitive news. However, the CARs subsequent to negative informed shocks are all positive and statistically significant, ranging from 0.97% (with a NW t-stat of 2.39) on day 1 to 2.42% (with a NW t-stat of 3.46) on day 5. This finding is consistent with 7 To shed further light on the issue of whether abnormal O/S reflects the trading activity of informed traders, we compare the abnormal O/S prior to informed shocks with the abnormal O/S observed in periods immediately before uninformed shocks. We find that the abnormal O/S before an uniformed shock is not significantly different from zero and its magnitude is significantly smaller than the abnormal O/S preceding an informed shock. This finding indicates that the pre-event abnormal O/S is likely to reflect the behavior of informed traders. Further details on these results are available upon request.
the overreaction hypothesis, which suggests that investors respond too strongly to unfavorable information and temporarily price securities below their intrinsic value (see, e.g., Howe, 1986; Bremer & Sweeney, 1991; Cox & Peterson, 1994) , but contradicts Choi and Jayaraman's (2009) evidence that only non-optioned stocks overreact to the arrival of negative news in the US market. We argue that the different reactions of the UK and US optioned stocks to negative news may be related, at least partly, to the differences in the levels of option and stock trading activity in these markets 8 .
- Table 5 about here
We use subsample analysis to investigate the relationship between option and stock trading activity and stock price efficiency. Specifically, we examine the price reaction to negative shocks associated with three subsamples (the top 30%, middle 40% and bottom 30%) of stocks ranked on the basis of abnormal options volume, abnormal stock volume, abnormal O/S and O/S over the [-3, -1] window around the events, respectively 9 . A summary of these results is presented in Table 6 . Panel A of Table 6 shows that the stocks with high levels of pre-event option trading activity react efficiently to negative price shocks while the overreaction effect is only observed in the case of stocks with low pre-event abnormal options volume. However, the paired t-test suggests that the CAR 1 and CAR 2 associated with the subsamples of stocks with high and low pre-event options volume are not significantly different from each other. The non-parametric MW test also suggests that, with the exception of CAR 4 and CAR 5 , the post-shock abnormal returns associated with stocks with high and low pre-event option volumes belong to the same distribution. Similarly, for CAR 1 to CAR 3, the KW test fails to reject the hypothesis that the post-event CARs of the three subsamples ranked by pre-event option volume are drawn from the same distribution. Table 6 about here Table 6 reports the post-event abnormal returns associated with the subsamples of low, medium and high pre-event abnormal stock volume. The CARs associated with the three subsamples are positive, but not statistically significant in most 8 The difference in the reactions of the US and UK markets to shocks may be related to other factors, including insider trading regulations (Fidrmuc et al., 2006) , executive option trades, option market regulation, and taxation differences on profits from option trading (Kyriacou et al., 2008) .
cases. The paired t-test and the MW test suggest that the post-shock CARs for stocks with high and low abnormal stock volume are not significantly different from each other. The KW test also fails to reject the hypothesis that the post-shock CARs associated with the subsamples ranked by abnormal stock volume are drawn from the same distribution.
Panel C of Table 6 Collectively, our results indicate that pre-event abnormal O/S is a better predictor of stock price patterns following negative shocks than pre-event O/S, implying that the former may contain more information about the future value of stocks than the latter.
Regression analysis
The previous section examines the impact of trading activity on the speed of stock price adjustments to information. Consistent with the view that active options markets improve stock price efficiency, we show that high pre-event abnormal O/S stocks experience significant price drops on the bad news announcement date and no significant abnormal returns on subsequent days. In this section, we investigate the relationship between trading activity measures and the sensitivity of stock prices to negative news announcements. Roll et al. (2010) argue that high levels of informed trading prior to an earnings announcement would be expected to result in bigger price movements after the announcement. Thus, the extent to which a trading activity measure can reflect informed trading is likely to depend on the ability of such a measure to predict the price movement caused by a news announcement.
This issue is formally investigated using the following regression model 10 :
where is the cumulative abnormal return of stock i over a window of days starting from the event (i.e. negative shock). ln and are the natural logarithms of stock i's book-to-market ratio and market capitalization measure on day -11 prior to the event, respectively. Fama and French (1993, 1996) show that the size and value characteristics are the key determinants of cross-sectional stock returns. Similarly, Bremer and Sweeney (1991) argue that the price reaction to a shock depends on the market capitalization of the firm. The variable is the momentum factor measured over the six-month period prior to the event date. Carhart (1997) shows that the momentum factor explains a significant proportion of the cross-sectional return variation. is the volatility of the stock return measured over the [-100, -11] - Table 7 reports the results of the OLS estimation of Eq.(10). The coefficients on ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ in Panel A of Table 7 are negative, but only significant in the case of CAR [0, +5] .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 7 about here ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The coefficients on ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ in Panel B are not significantly different from zero, implying that the level of trading activity in stocks does not predict the post-event CARs.
Panel C shows that ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ is negatively and significantly associated with all the postshock CARs. This finding suggests that pre-event abnormal O/S may capture the extent of informed trading, as more informed trading prior to the negative events may result in greater price declines in the post-event periods. For comparison purposes, we also estimate Eq. (10) using average pre-event O/S over the window [-3,-1] around the events ( ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ ) as an alternative trading activity measure. The results in Panel D of Table 7 show that ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ is also negatively associated with the post-event CARs, but its coefficient is only significant when CAR [0,+1] is used as the dependent variable. To gain further insight into whether informed trading is better captured by pre-event abnormal O/S or pre-event O/S, we also include both ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ and ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ as explanatory variables in Eq. (10) 11 . While the details are not reported, so as to save space, the results indicate that ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ is negatively and significantly associated with the post-event CARs but the coefficients on ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ are not significantly different from zero. This finding, therefore, suggests that informed trading may be better captured by pre-event abnormal O/S than pre-event O/S.
The coefficients on in Table 7 are consistently positive and statistically significant, implying that growth stocks react less strongly to negative market signals than to value stocks. This finding is consistent with Rozeff and Zaman (1998) , who show that growth stocks tend to lie above their fundamental values and value stocks tend to lie below their fundamental values. The remaining variables in Table 7 , namely , and , are statistically insignificant in most cases.
11 While the correlation between ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ and ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ is quite high (0.532), the variance inflation factor (VIF) indicates that including both variables in the regression does not result in multicollinearity problems.
Robustness checks
We carry out a number of robustness checks to investigate the sensitivity of our findings to alternative volume measures, the length of the pre-event benchmark period, and an alternative definition of shocks. The results of the robustness checks are presented in Table 8 . To save space, we only report the results associated with using as a trading activity measure 12 .
- Table 8 about here
Pound volume measure
In this subsection, we examine the robustness of our earlier findings to the use of the 
The magnitude of the price shock
Definitions of price shocks tend to vary considerably across studies. For example, Dennis and Strickland (2002) define shocks as daily market price declines in excess of 2%, 12 The results associated with and are available upon request.
Bremer and Sweeney (1991) use daily price drops of 10% or more, and Howe (1986) employs weekly price changes of more than 50%. To verify the sensitivity of our results to the identification of extreme events, we repeat our analysis using one-day price movements in excess of 5% (sign ignored) as price shocks. Applying the filtering process described in Section 3 to the 5% price changes, we identified a total of 730 informed shocks ( 
Pre-event benchmark period
There is no consensus in the empirical literature on the choice of the pre-event benchmark period. To investigate the sensitivity of our findings to the choice of estimation windows, we repeat our analysis using the averaged volume in the pre-event period [-120, -20] as an alternative benchmark. Panel C of Table 8 shows that, with the exception of day -5, the values of on the days immediately before announcements of bad news with large price impacts are positive and significant. Furthermore, the abnormal O/S over the [-5, - 1] and [-3, -1] windows are 21.68% and 32.69%, respectively. The NW t-stat implies that these figures are significant at less than the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Panel C of Table 8 also reports abnormal O/S prior to positive shocks. It also shows that the abnormal O/S preceding positive shocks are not significantly different from zero and that their magnitudes are generally smaller than those observed prior to negative shocks. This finding is consistent with our earlier evidence suggesting that informed traders are less active in options markets before positive news.
Conclusion
This study provides an innovative approach to investigating informed trading activity in the stock and options markets. Our analysis yields the following important conclusions.
First, the pre-event abnormal volume analysis indicates that informed agents are more likely to trade in the options market ahead of bad news than good news. Specifically, we report significant abnormal option volumes prior to negative shocks and significant abnormal stock volumes in the periods immediately before positive shocks. We show that pre-event abnormal O/S is only significant in the case of negative news, indicating that, due to short-sale constraints, informed traders are more likely to transact in options in response to negative signals than positive ones. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of event windows, options volume measures and price shocks.
Second, by examining stock price reactions to shocks, we show that the impact of option listing on the informational efficiency of stocks depends on the option trading activity over and above the presence of an options market. Specifically, we show that optioned stock prices react efficiently to informed positive shocks, but overreact to negative ones. The overreaction of optioned stocks to negative news contradicts the US evidence of Peterson are the abnormal stock volume (the number of shares traded over shares outstanding), abnormal option trading volume (the natural logarithm of the number of option contracts traded) and abnormal option trading relative to stock trading (options volume over stock volume), respectively. Each abnormal volume measure is calculated as its own value on event day t over its historical average value during a benchmark period between t-100 and t-11. The fixed windows of [-5,-1] and [-3, -1] means averaged abnormal values between event day -5 and -1 and between event day -3 and -1, respectively. A negative price shock is defined as a daily price drop of more than 10%, while a positive price shock is for a daily price increase of more than 10%. We report the Newey-West adjusted t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The market model is estimated from t-200 to t-11 and the prediction period is from event day 0 to event day +5. CAR is cumulative abnormal returns, which are accumulated from event day 1 to event day 5. We report the Newey-West adjusted t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. [-3, -1] window prior to the arrival of negative news with a significant price impact (≤-10%). The low, middle and high groups are defined as the bottom 30%, middle 40% and top 30% of the abnormal measure in question. CARs are cumulative abnormal returns calculated by estimating the market model from t-200 to t-11, and the prediction period is from event day 0 to event day 5. We report the NeweyWest adjusted t-statistics in parentheses. We also use two non-parametric tests, Mann-Whitney (MW) and Kruskal-Wallis (KW), to examine whether the abnormal returns associated with different groups of stocks are statistically different from each other. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Vol  , respectively. lnMV and lnBVMV are total market capitalization and the book-to-market ratio on event day -11, respectively. MOM is the past six-month returns, ending on event day -11. Ris is a stock's return standard deviations in [-100,-11] . The total number of observations is 217. The Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. in the period from day -120 to -20. We report the Newey-West adjusted t-statistics in parentheses. *,** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
TABLE1. Sample stock characteristics

